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Abstract 
Recent empirical literature provides evidence that financial literacy, 
human capital, education, savings and stock market participation are 
interconnected decisions. However, a consolidated theoretical explanation 
of such connections is missing. We contribute to this topic by building a 
framework that includes all these decisions in an encompassing model. 
We build a two-period model in which individuals acquire education, 
work and save for retirement; financial literacy reduces the costs of 
managing risky assets available on the stock market. Our results, besides 
providing a theoretical foundation for the role and the determinants of the 
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1. Introduction 
Recent reforms of pension systems in several countries entail a higher degree of 
responsibility on workers’ side. This fact, together with an increasing degree of complexity of 
individuals’ financial decisions, has induced both scholars and policymakers to focus on the 
determinants and the role of financial decisions, such as saving, stock market participation 
and financial education. 
While quite a large number of empirical studies have shed light on the relevance of 
financial literacy as a key determinant of crucial life-time decisions such as retirement 
planning and stock market participation (we review these contributions in section 2; see also 
Mitchell and Lusardi, 2011 for a full coverage on this subject), the theoretical literature on 
these issues is rather thin. 
Among the few studies that cover theoretical aspects, Jappelli and Padula (2013) develop 
a model where financial literacy affects the returns of non-stochastic savings. Lusardi et al. 
(2011) develop a numerically simulated life-cycle model where endogenous financial literacy 
affects the stochastic returns from saving and where exogenous education determines income. 
Finally, Corsini and Spataro (2015) develop a theoretical model where individuals’ decisions 
on pension plans are affected by complexity costs embedded in more sophisticated plans and 
investigate how the acquisition of financial literacy influences pension-saving decisions.  
On similar lines, even if not directly tackling financial literacy, some works analyze the 
impact that the acquisition of information and the time spent on asset management can exert 
on investment behavior. In particular, Ehrlich et al. (2008) analyze how time spent in 
acquiring information reduces volatility of risky investments and connect this activity to the 
level of (non-endogenous) human capital. Ehrlich and Shin (2010) and Ehrlich et al. (2011) 
further develop this aspect by distinguishing between the role of general human capital and 
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the role of “specific” human capital, that is, the component of human capital that is 
particularly useful for managing risky assets of a given country or context. 
In this work we aim at making a step further in the theoretical literature on individual 
financial decisions by providing a unified framework that encompasses human capital 
formation, financial education, savings and capital market participation. To the best of our 
knowledge, this has not been done so far. 
In particular, differently from previous literature we focus i) on the fact that the 
acquisition of financial literacy is beneficial to individuals for managing risky assets on the 
stock market and thus for diversifying their savings and ii) on the interaction between 
financial literacy and education, with the latter being endogenously determined and affecting 
both lifetime income and the cost to acquire financial literacy. Consequently, within our 
model, savings, financial literacy, education and investment decisions strictly interact and are 
endogenously determined. 
By doing this, we obtain a relationship between financial literacy, education, income and 
wealth that, although complex, is in line with several observed facts and also stirs some 
further empirical questions that are worth being addressed. 
The work is organized as follows. In section 2 we sketch some stylized facts on financial 
literacy acquisition and stock market participation unveiled by recent empirical studies. In 
section 3 we lay out the model and sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the determinants of stock 
market participation, financial literacy acquisition and wealth accumulation. The empirical 
implications of our analysis are provided in Section 6. Concluding remarks end the work. 
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2. Some stylized facts on financial education, saving, human capital and 
stock market participation 
A number of empirical studies have analyzed the subject of financial literacy, its 
determinants and its consequences on saving decisions and investment behavior. Usually, in 
these works financial literacy is measured through surveys that contain questions on the 
concepts of interest compounding, inflation, purchasing power and risk diversification: on the 
basis of the number of correct answers a literacy score is computed for each individual. 
2.1. Determinants of financial literacy 
Several works analyze the determinants of literacy: some of them are single-country 
studies1, while others, like Jappelli (2010) and Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a), contain cross-
country analyses. These studies highlight some common patterns in both the determinants 
and the effects of financial literacy and they indicate that financial literacy: 
- is lower among younger and older individuals; 
- is lower among female individuals; 
- is usually higher for self-employed workers and for individuals working in business-
related sectors; 
- is higher for higher income individuals; 
- is higher for individuals with higher mathematical and numeracy skills; 
- increases with education (schooling) but the actual relationship can be complex. 
                                                          
1 Analyses from Alessie et al. (2011), Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh, (2011), Crossan et al. (2011), 
Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011), Fornero and Monticone (2011), Klapper and Panos (2011), 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b) and Sekita (2011) cover, respectively, Netherlands, Sweden, New 
Zeland, Germany, Italy, Russia, United States and Japan. Evidence from United States on the effect of 
financial literacy on planning and wealth accumulation is also contained in Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007). Finally, evidence from Italy on the effect of literacy on portfolio diversification is contained in 
Guiso and Jappelli (2009) while evidence from Sweden on how less-sophisticated investors tend to 
achieve under-diversification is contained in Anderson (2013). 
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Among these stylized facts, the evidence on the relationship between education and 
financial literacy requires some further specifications. First, education and financial literacy 
appear to be correlated but there is evidence that the field of study is also relevant in 
explaining how the level of schooling actually affects financial literacy (see Almenberg and 
Save-Soderbergh, 2011). Moreover, when both education and literacy are used as explicative 
variables in econometric regressions, they are usually both significant so that literacy appears 
to have an effect above and beyond education (see Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011a). 
Finally, some works have also unveiled that age has a relevant effect on literacy and the 
relationship has an inverted U-shaped pattern. Empirical analyses found that people in the 35-
65 age group have higher literacy than those outside this age interval: the actual peak in 
literacy varies depending on the country under investigation, in some cases it falls in the 35-
50 age group while sometime in the 51-65 age group (see Alessie et al., 2011; Bucher-
Koenen and Lusardi, 2011; Fornero and Monticone 2011; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011b). 
2.2. The effects and consequences of financial literacy 
From the empirical works we have mentioned above, some clear-cut empirical results 
on the effects of financial literacy emerge. In particular, financial literacy: 
- affects positively the probability to plan for retirement; 
- affects positively, other things being equal, wealth accumulation; 
- is positively correlated with the degree of portfolio diversification; 
- is positively correlated with stock market participation. 
Evidence that financial literacy affects positively, other things being equal, wealth 
accumulation is also detected in Lusardi et al. (2007), Behrman et al. (2012) and van Rooij et 
al. (2012) and, in particular, this causal effect persists even after controlling for factors like 
income, age and education.  
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2.3. Participation in stock markets 
The issue of participation in stock markets has also been the object of specific empirical 
analyses. As already mentioned in the previous subsection, several works confirm that 
participation is higher for individuals endowed with higher financial literacy. Moreover, 
Bertaut and Haliassos (1995), Christiansen et al. (2008) and van Rooij et al. (2011) have 
highlighted several common features that, even after controlling for the positive effect of 
financial literacy, explain participation in the stock market. The main evidence on 
participation is that it:  
- increases with income level; 
- increases with education level and depends on the field of study; 
- increases when stock markets are more attractive; 
- decreases with risk aversion; 
- is lower for female2. 
The specific effect of the field of study is addressed by Christiansen et al. (2008), who 
find that individuals with higher education in economics-related disciplines are, all things 
considered, more likely to invest in the stock market. As for the role of gender, Powell and 
Ansic (1997) find that female are less likely to take risks in financial investments. The 
evidence on the role of the attractiveness of stock markets is contained in the works by 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Thomas and Spataro (2015), who argue that households 
observing higher stock returns, even at early adult life, are more likely to participate in stock 
markets. 
                                                          
2 Among other factors not addressed here, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012) show that also religious 
beliefs affect saving attitude and stock market participation. 
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2.4. Stylized facts and our theoretical contribution 
All the above stylized facts highlight how financial literacy and education, on one hand, 
and savings and participation in stock markets, on the other hand, are strictly related, not only 
because the former variables strongly affect the latter, but also because several factors appear 
to concurrently play a role in determining all these life-time investment decisions. 
In what follows we present a model that aims at encompassing all these issues in a 
unified framework, thus providing both a possible explanation of the stylized facts listed 
above and some new testable predictions on the role and determinants of saving behavior, 
stock market participation and financial literacy acquisition. 
3. A Theoretical Model of Human Capital and Saving 
We imagine an economy populated by individuals that live for two periods: in the first 
one they make a choice between education and labor supply and between consumption and 
saving; in the second period, they consume what they have saved. 
Within this basic structure, we add three characterizing features: (i) savings can be 
invested either in a safe or in a risky asset (or both) and the latter can only be bought on the 
stock market; (ii) the management of complex financial assets is time-consuming and, to 
reduce the time-cost entailed in this activity, individuals may find it convenient to acquire or 
increase their level of financial literacy (iii) literacy acquisition is also time-consuming but 
the share of time needed for this investment decreases with the level of human capital. Points 
(ii) and (iii) reflect in particular the fact that investing in risky assets requires some 
knowledge of the mechanism behind stocks (something that is also suggested in Bertaut and 
Haliassos, 1995) as well as some effort to track asset performance. It follows that individuals 
may find it convenient to invest some time in obtaining financial education; our assumption is 
that the knowledge obtained from generic education effectively reduces the amount of time 
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needed to acquire financial literacy, although to a different extent dependent on the field of 
study. 
Basically we are assuming that individuals’ actions reflect the following timeline: in 
period 1 they i) choose how much human capital to acquire, ii) work and obtain a given 
income, iii) choose whether to sustain financial management costs and iv) make consumption 
and investment decisions. In period 2, they simply consume what they have saved. 
As for the very investment decision, we assume that individuals not only choose how 
much to save but also decide whether and how much to invest in financial education. In fact, 
the latter investment may help them diversify their savings between two assets (i.e. 
participating in the stock market). We assume that risky assets provide higher returns 
although they entail higher volatility and complexity: consequently, since the management 
cost of risky assets is higher, in this case the investment in financial literacy can be 
particularly rewarding; on the contrary, we imagine that the cost to manage safe assets is 
nearly negligible.3 
3.1. Basic Definitions 
In this subsection we characterize the structure of the model and define its components. 
3.1.1. Lifetime utility 
Individuals live for two periods (working life and retirement) and their lifetime utility is 
given by 
                                                          
3 We should mention that financial literacy could also have a direct effect on returns or volatility of 
assets. In our contribution, although not treating this case explicitly, we allow for similar effects in 
that we assume that literacy facilitates the managing of assets and, thus, it can increase net returns (i.e. 
net of management costs) of financial investments. For an example in which financial literacy directly 
affects the returns of (safe) assets see Jappelli and Padula (2013). For works where the acquisition of 
information exerts an impact on the volatility of investments see Ehrlich et al. (2008), Ehrlich and 
Shin (2010) and Ehrlich et al. (2011). 
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𝑈 = −𝑒−𝑎𝑐1   − 𝛽𝑒−𝑎𝑐2        (1) 
where c₁ and c₂ are consumption in period one and two respectively, a is the absolute risk 
aversion coefficient and 𝛽 measures time preference. The above utility function displays the 
CARA property and is chosen to obtain closed form solutions: however, as we describe in 
details in subsection 3.1.4, we also allow for an inverse relationship between the risk 
coefficient a and total resources to be invested, which is in line with observed facts. 
3.1.2. The time constraint 
According to our set-up, in the first period of life individuals split their time-endowment 
(normalized to 1) between time devoted to general education 𝜃, labor supply 𝑙 and time spent 
for financial management c. The time constraint is thus: 
𝜃 + 𝑙 + 𝑐 = 1.         (2) 
3.1.3. Human Capital 
As for the investment in general education4, we assume that human capital (h) production 
function is given by 
ℎ = 𝜃1/𝑥          (3) 
                                                          
4 For the sake of simplicity we do not allow human capital acquisition before the working life: 
although this assumption does not affect qualitatively our results, it probably increases the optimal 
time spent in education and, consequently reduces the optimal time spent on the job. As a 
consequence, if we added pre-working life human capital acquisition, the determinants of stock 
market participation and financial literacy would not change, although we would probably obtain, 
other things being equal, more participation on the stock markets and more individuals investing in 
financial literacy. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to the consequences of this 
assumption.  
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where x measures the degree of effectiveness of the education process in producing human 
capital. We assume that x>1 so that human capital production has decreasing returns, in line 
with the empirical evidence (see Blundell et al., 1999; Blundell et al., 2000; Dearden, 1999). 
3.1.4. Income 
The income per time-unit w depends on the amount of human capital acquired through 
education and on a scale factor k>1. The amount of income per time-unit worked is 
 𝑤 = 𝑘ℎ.           (4) 
The working life income W is the product of income per time-unit w and labor supply l: 
𝑊 = 𝑘ℎ𝑙.           (5) 
Note that W is an increasing function of k. 
3.1.5. Risk aversion 
To make our model more realistic we also allow for an inverse relationship between risk 
aversion and individual’s lifetime resources and therefore we assume that 
𝑎 = 𝑘−𝛼          (6) 
where 𝛼 > 0 is the elasticity of risk aversion with respect to income.5 Given the above 
function, we are assuming that only the exogenous determinant of lifetime resources (that is, 
the parameter k) influences risk aversion. We make this assumption to guarantee that human 
capital does not influence directly risk aversion and to avoid that individuals, when 
determining their optimal level of human capital and wealth, are also choosing their own 
degree of risk aversion. 
                                                          
5 This methodology of dealing with lifetime resources and decreasing risk aversion has been first 
proposed by Makarov and Schornick (2010) and can help explain the empirical finding that richer 
individuals have a preference for riskier assets (see, for example, Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). 
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Given eq. (6), an increase in 𝛼 implies, other things being equal, a decrease in risk 
aversion. Moreover, relative risk aversion is increasing for  0 < 𝛼 < 1, constant for 𝛼 = 1 
and decreasing for 𝛼 > 1. 
3.1.6. Savings 
Individuals can save through two possible assets. A safe asset yielding a certain rate of 
return s and a risky asset, available on the stock market, providing a rate of return that is 
normally distributed with mean r and variance σ². We indicate with S the amount invested in 
the safe asset and with R the amount invested in the risky asset. 
3.1.7. Costs for financial assets management 
Managing financial assets is a complex task and some time is needed to handle and to 
track stock performance. Consequently, there are some opportunity costs associated with the 
possibility to invest in assets, which cover the time spent to manage them and to acquire the 
needed financial knowledge. Given the complexity of stock markets, we can assume that 
these costs are particularly relevant for individuals that enter the stock market, while they are 
much smaller or even negligible for individuals that only invest in safe assets. 
We assume that the total time-cost of managing financial investments, c (measured in 
time unit), depends on two components: q, related to time spent managing financial assets 
and f, related to time spent investing in financial knowledge, L. Moreover, it is likely that the 
former component is affected by the latter: that is, acquiring financial knowledge strictly 
reduces the time needed to manage financial assets. Total cost in unit of time thus reads as 
𝑐 = 𝑑(𝑞 + 𝑓)          (7) 
where 𝑑 ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures the degree of complexity of this activity; clearly, 
the corresponding opportunity cost is 𝑐 ∙ 𝑤. We develop our analysis in such a way that c will 
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depend inversely on the stock of human capital of the individual. In particular, it can be 
shown that when individuals are allowed to optimally choose q and f (and thus acquire 
financial education L), eq. (7) reads as (see appendix A for details): 
𝑐(ℎ) = 𝑑(1 − ℎ1−𝑧)         (8) 
where the parameter 0<z<1 is a measure of the effectiveness of human capital (i.e. education) 
in facilitating the acquisition of financial knowledge. We note that, by this specification, 
different fields of education have different degrees of complementarity with financial skills 
and such a degree of closeness of human capital to financial education is in fact captured by 
the parameter z. In other words, the latter parameter measures to what extend human capital 
is specifically useful in facilitating asset management and in acquiring financial literacy. 
From this point of view there could be some similarities with the concept of “specific” human 
capital introduced in Ehrlich and Shin (2010) and Ehrlich et al (2011). However, while in 
these contributions specific human capital represents the knowledge about a specific country 
or region, in the present work z captures those skills and knowledge that enhance the 
acquisition of financial literacy and increase efficiency in managing any asset.6 
3.2. The optimization problem 
As for financial investments, individuals must choose whether to enter the stock market 
and buy risky assets (thus paying also higher costs) or to simply invest in safe assets. In the 
first case they choose the optimal amount of h, S and R, whereas in the second case they 
simply choose h and S. Depending on the complexity of assets, agents might sustain a time-
                                                          
6 We recognize that z, interpreted as the field of study could, at least in part, be endogenous. However, 
for the sake of tractability we leave the analysis of this case for future research. As for the present 
paper, we could also interpret this parameter as the intensity by which the education system of a 
country or of a region provides economics-related topics in compulsory education, which is 
exogenous to individuals. 
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cost: for the sake of simplicity here we assume that the parameter d in eq. (8) is equal to 0 for 
safe assets and 1 for risky assets. 
The optimal amounts chosen under the two alternatives (safe assets only or a 
combination of risky and safe assets) determine two different indirect expected utilities, one 
for each investment strategy. By convention, we assume that individuals do not enter the 
stock market when the two indirect utilities are equal. At the end of this subsection we will be 
able to show the optimal choice of human capital, consumption and saving in the two cases 
and the resulting indirect expected utilities. 
3.2.1. Safe assets only 
If an individual does not join the stock market all savings will be invested into the safe 
asset only. In this case, asset management is rather simple and, given our assumption, no 
time-cost must be paid for it nor to acquire incremental financial education. The individual 
time constraint implies then 
𝑙 = 1 − 𝜃 = 1 − ℎ𝑥         (9) 
and the following budget constraints hold: 
𝑐1 = 𝑊 − 𝑆 = 𝑘ℎ(1 − ℎ
𝑥) − 𝑆       (10) 
 𝑐2 = 𝑆(1 + 𝑠).         (10a) 
Substituting eqs. (10) and (10a) into (1), the individual maximization problem is: 
max
ℎ,𝑆
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥)−𝑆]   − 𝛽𝑒−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)]      (11) 
and the solution implies 
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ℎ∗ = (
1
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥
          (12) 
𝑆∗ = [𝑘ℎ∗(1 − (ℎ∗)𝑥) +
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
]
1
2+𝑠
  ,       (13) 
where ℎ∗ and 𝑆∗ are the optimal levels of human capital and saving, respectively (the formal 
derivation of eqs. (12) and (13) is provided in Appendix B). 
The above solutions also provide the following optimal lifetime income 𝑊∗ 
𝑊∗ = 𝑘ℎ∗(1 − ℎ∗) = 𝑘 (
𝑥
1+𝑥
) (
1
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥
.       (14) 
Finally, the associated indirect utility when investing in the safe asset only is: 
𝐸𝑈∗ = −(
2+𝑠
1+𝑠
) 𝑒
−𝑎(
1
2+𝑠
)((1+𝑠)𝑊∗−
log𝛽(1+𝑠) 
𝑎
 )
.      (15) 
3.2.2. Safe and risky assets 
An individual choosing to enter the stock market can invest their savings in either the 
safe or risky asset (or both), but in any case has to pay the time-cost c for asset management 
and to invest in extra financial education. Given our assumptions, the time constraints is 
𝑙 = 1 − 𝜃 − 𝑐 = ℎ1−𝑧 − ℎ𝑥        (16) 
and the associated budget constraints are: 
𝑐1 = 𝑊 − 𝑐(ℎ)𝑤 − 𝑆 − 𝑅 = 𝑘ℎ(−ℎ
𝑥 + ℎ1−𝑧) − 𝑆 − 𝑅    (17) 
 𝑐2~𝑁(𝑆(1 + 𝑠) + 𝑅(1 + 𝑟), 𝑅
2𝜎2)       (17a) 
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where 𝑐2 is now a stochastic variable (in fact, returns from risky asset are stochastic). Given 
the above equations for consumption, the maximization problem becomes7 
max
ℎ,𝑆,𝑅
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(−ℎ
𝑥+ℎ1−𝑧)−𝑆−𝑅]   − 𝛽𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2
]
.   (18) 
The solution of eq. (18) implies 
ℎ𝐹
∗ = (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥−1+𝑧
         (19) 
where ℎ𝐹
∗  is the optimal amount of human capital when the individual decides to invest also 
in risky assets. Interestingly, by comparing eqs. (12) and (19) it descends that ℎ𝐹
∗ > ℎ∗: in 
fact, given that human capital reduces the cost of asset management, individuals joining the 
stock market also find it convenient to invest more in education. The above equation also 
yields the following optimal lifetime income (𝑊𝐹
∗) and savings (𝑅𝐹
∗ , 𝑆𝐹
∗):  
𝑊𝐹
∗ = 𝑘 (
𝑥−1+𝑧
2−𝑧
) (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1+𝑥
𝑥−1+𝑧
.        (20) 
𝑅𝐹
∗ =
𝑟−𝑠
𝑎𝜎2
          (21) 
𝑆𝐹
∗ = [𝑊𝐹
∗ +
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
− (2 +
𝑟+𝑠
2
)
𝑟−𝑠
𝑎𝜎2
] (
1
2+𝑠
)     (22) 
where 𝑆𝐹
∗ and 𝑅𝐹
∗  are, respectively, the optimal amount of safe and risky investments (the 
formal derivation of eqs. (19), (21) and (22) is provided in Appendix B). Finally, the indirect 
utility in this case is 
𝐸𝑈𝐹
∗ = −
2+𝑠
1+𝑠
𝑒
−𝑎[(1+𝑠)𝑊𝐹
∗−
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
+
(𝑟−𝑠)2
2𝑎𝜎2
](
1
2+𝑠
)
.     (23) 
                                                          
7 We exploit here a well-known property by which, for any given stochastic variable nj distributed 
normally with mean n and variance 𝜎𝑛
2, we have that  𝐸(𝑒−𝑎𝑛𝑗) = 𝑒−𝑎(𝑛−𝑎𝜎𝑛
2/2): see Varian (1992). 
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3.3. Participation in the stock market and acquisition of financial literacy 
As already mentioned, individuals choose to enter the stock market when the resulting 
indirect utility is higher than the one obtaining in the alternative strategy. In terms of our 
model this happens if 𝐸𝑈𝐹
∗ > 𝐸𝑈∗, that is, given eqs. (15) and (23), if 
−(
2+𝑠
1+𝑠
) 𝑒
−𝑎[(1+𝑠)𝑊𝐹
∗−
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
+
(𝑟−𝑠)2
2𝑎𝜎2
](
1
2+𝑠
)
> −(
2+𝑠
1+𝑠
) 𝑒−𝑎(
1
2+𝑠
)[(1+𝑠)𝑊∗−
log𝛽(1+𝑠) 
𝑎
] 
 (24) 
which implies 
𝑊∗ −𝑊𝐹
∗ <
1
1+𝑠
(𝑟−𝑠)2
2𝑎𝜎2
 .        (24a) 
Exploiting eqs. (6), (14) and (20), inequality (24a) reads as: 
(
𝑥
1+𝑥
) (
1
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥
− (
𝑥−1+𝑧
2−𝑧
) (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1+𝑥
𝑥−1+𝑧
<
1
𝑘1−𝛼
[
1
1+𝑠
(𝑟−𝑠)2
2𝜎2
]     (24b) 
The above inequality determines univocally whether individuals invest in the stock market 
and acquire financial literacy or not. 
The left hand side of inequality (24b) is a decreasing function of x and z (the proof is 
contained in Appendix C): thus, individuals whose education investment is more effective in 
producing human capital (i.e. higher x) or in abating portfolio management costs (i.e. higher 
z) are more likely to participate in the stock market and to acquire financial education.  
The right hand side of inequality (24b) is increasing in the risk premium (r-s) and 
decreasing in the degree of risk aversion (in fact, the RHS is increasing in 𝛼), the variance of 
risky asset returns and the return from the safe asset, which implies that individuals are more 
likely to invest in risky assets and acquire financial literacy when the excess return of the 
risky asset is high, when its volatility is low and when their risk aversion is low. The RHS 
also depends on lifetime income, as the latter influences both risk aversion and the 
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opportunity costs of risky assets management. However, these effects are only due to the 
component k of lifetime resources and the sign of the total effect depends on the value of 𝛼: 
for 𝛼<1 the component k has a negative effect on the RHS, for 𝛼 > 1 it has a positive effect 
and for 𝛼 = 1 it has no effect. Accordingly, for a given level of human capital, richer 
individuals are more/less likely to enter the stock market and acquire financial literacy 
depending on whether the value of the elasticity of risk aversion with respect to lifetime 
income is larger/lower than 1, respectively. 
For illustrative purposes in Figure 1 we present a graphic representation of inequality 
(24b), where 𝐺 ≡
1
𝑘1−𝛼
[
1
1+𝑠
(𝑟−𝑠)2
2𝜎2
] is the RHS and the two decreasing curves represent the 
LHS, that is the difference between 𝑊∗ −𝑊𝐹
∗, as a function of x, for two distinct values of z 
(z=0.8 and z=0.9 for the higher and lower curve respectively). For values of the curve below 
the G line individuals enter the stock market and invest in financial education. As it is clear 
from the decreasing pattern of the curves, only individuals with a value of x higher than a 
certain threshold x* actually invest in risky assets management. Moreover, an increase in the 
value of z shifts the curve downward so that the threshold value of x becomes smaller. 
Figure 1: Threshold levels of x determining the incentives to invest in stock market and financial 
literacy, for different levels of z. 
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Finally, our model also determines the optimal amount of literacy that individuals 
acquire to abate the management costs of risky assets. This optimal amount is obtained 
through the optimization process on time allocation that delivered eq. (8) and is equal to (see 
appendix A): 
𝐿∗ = (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1−𝑧
𝑥−1+𝑧
.          (25) 
4. The determinants of financial literacy and of stock market participation 
 
In the light of the analysis carried out so far, we can summarize our findings through 
several propositions. The following two propositions stem from inequality (24b). 
Proposition 1. The share of individuals that acquire financial literacy and participate to the 
stock market is an increasing function of the excess return of risky assets (r-s) and a 
decreasing function of the rate of return of the safe asset s and of the variance of risky asset 
returns (𝜎2). 
Proof. The proof follows by inspection of the RHS of inequality (24b). ∎ 
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Quite obviously, the share of individuals participating in the stock market increases when 
the risky asset becomes more attractive in terms of mean returns and volatility. In addition, an 
increase of the return of safe asset (keeping the risk premium constant) reduces participation. 
This is due to the fact that when s increases the overall wealth increases as well and this 
magnifies the difference between 𝑊∗ and 𝑊𝐹
∗ (as the former is strictly larger than the latter).  
By exploiting the LHS of inequality (24), we can write the following: 
Proposition 2. Individuals bestowed with larger values of x and z are more likely to acquire 
financial literacy and to participate in the stock market. 
Proof. See Appendix C. 
We can provide an economic interpretation of the content of Proposition 2. In fact, the 
parameter x measures how effective individuals are in acquiring education and human capital 
(or how effective the education system is in providing individuals with human capital). 
Hence, individuals with larger values of x, ceteris paribus, acquire more human capital and, 
as a side effect of human capital and education, sustain lower costs for asset management and 
financial literacy acquisition. Consequently, these individuals are more likely to enter the 
stock market and acquire literacy. As for parameter z, it measures how effective human 
capital and education are in abating the financial management costs: individuals with higher 
value of z have trained in education activities that are closer to finance and their costs to 
manage risky assets and to acquire financial literacy are smaller. 
Finally, we can also provide the following Proposition on the optimal amount of 
financial literacy: 
Proposition 3. The amount of financial literacy acquired is larger for individuals bestowed 
with larger x and larger z. 
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Proof. See Appendix C. 
This result reflects two relevant economic mechanisms: first, when the acquisition of 
human capital is more effective (higher x) individuals end up having larger human capital and 
this makes it easier to acquire literacy; second, a human capital that is closer to the financial 
sector (higher z) further reduces the cost of acquiring literacy and this provides incentives to 
invest in it. This result also implies that the level of financial literacy, for individuals of a 
given degree of education, varies depending on z: that is, individuals with the same years of 
schooling could have acquired different levels of financial literacy, depending on their actual 
field of study.  
5. Savings and Wealth accumulation 
In this section we explore the role that individuals’ financial investment strategy has in 
determining wealth accumulation. 
For the sake of simplicity, we define wealth as the total amount that has been 
accumulated during the working-life, net of capitalization of interests: at the end of the 
section we will discuss how the results are even more robust if we also include the 
capitalization of interests.  
We compute first the total amounts saved by individuals who invested in safe assets and 
did not invested in the stock market. In particular, if an individual does not invest in risky 
assets the resulting total lifetime savings are equal to the amount invested in the safe asset: 
𝑆∗ = [𝑊∗ +
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
]
1
2+𝑠
.         (26) 
On the contrary, if an individual enters the stock market, total savings are given by the sum of 
the amounts invested both in the safe and in the risky asset: 
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𝑆𝐹
∗ + 𝑅𝐹
∗ = [𝑊𝐹
∗ +
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
]
1
2+𝑠
  + (1 −
𝑟−𝑠
2
1
2+𝑠
)
𝑟−𝑠
2𝑎𝜎2
.     (27) 
Given the above results we can evaluate whether joining the stock market and acquiring 
financial literacy implies higher wealth accumulation. Suppose then that we observe two 
different individuals: agent 1 has entered the stock market while agent 2 has not, either 
because they have different preferences (identified by different values of  𝛽 and 𝑎) or 
different values of any of the triplet (𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑘). The difference in their total savings is given by 
the following (the subscript identifies the agent): 
 𝑆𝐹,1
∗ + 𝑅𝐹,1
∗ − 𝑆2 = [𝑊𝐹,1
∗ −𝑊2
∗ +
log𝛽1(1+𝑠)
𝑎1
−
log𝛽2(1+𝑠)
𝑎2
]
1
2+𝑠
 + (1 −
𝑟−𝑠
2
1
2+𝑠
)
𝑟−𝑠
2𝑎1𝜎2
. (28) 
We can exploit the above equation to formulate the following proposition: 
Proposition 4. Suppose that two individuals are identical in terms of lifetime income (W), 
risk aversion (a) and time preference (𝛽) but they differ in that the former has entered the 
stock market and acquired financial literacy and the latter has not. Then, if  𝑟 < 4 + 3𝑠, the 
former individual accumulates also a larger amount of wealth. 
Proof. If individuals are identical in terms of their lifetime income, risk aversion and time 
preferences we have, by assumption, 𝑊𝐹,1
∗ −𝑊2
∗ = 0  (by eqs. (14) and (20) and, given a 
triplet (𝑥1, 𝑧1, 𝑘1), we can always find a combination of 𝑥2, 𝑧2 and 𝑘2 providing such an 
equality), 𝑎1 = 𝑎2 and 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 and, consequently, from eq. (28) we have 𝑆𝐹,1
∗ + 𝑅𝐹,1
∗ − 𝑆2 =
(1 −
𝑟−𝑠
2
1
2+𝑠
)
𝑟−𝑠
2𝑎1𝜎2
. The latter is strictly positive for 𝑟 < 4 + 3𝑠. ∎ 
Condition  𝑟 < 4 + 3𝑠 is satisfied for realistic values of the parameters, so that our results 
imply that individuals that have invested in the stock market and acquired financial literacy 
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accumulate a higher amount of wealth8 relative to individuals who have the same preferences 
and life-time income but did not invested in stock markets nor in financial literacy. 
In our definition of wealth we did not include the capitalization of returns: if we had also 
included this factor, given that 𝐸(𝑟) > 𝑠, it is easy to see that the wealth of individuals 
investing in the stock market and financial literacy would be, on average, larger than the 
amount accumulated by the others, for an even less stringent condition than 𝑟 < 4 + 3𝑠. That 
is, engaging in risky assets management would imply, on average, an even larger 
accumulation of wealth. 
6. Main Findings and Reconciling Theory with Evidence 
The model we have presented delivers some clear-cut results on the determinants of 
financial literacy acquisition and stock market participation. In this section we compare our 
theoretical findings with the stylized facts presented in section 2 and we also provide some 
further empirical insights. 
6.1. Education and numeracy 
According to our results, there is a positive relationship between education and 
financial literacy. However, the degree of education and financial literacy are not perfectly 
correlated: in fact, the field of study (possibly represented by the parameter z in our model) is 
                                                          
8 Assuming that a period is 30 years long, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the inequality 
𝑟 < 4 + 3𝑠 to be satisfied is that the excess return does not exceed 4%. Therefore, only for extremely 
high excess return the conclusion could be reverted: this theoretical occurrence is due to income effect 
that, when r is extremely high relative to s, induces individuals that are investing in the stock market 
to consume more in both periods, thus reducing the amount they are saving. A numerical exercise can 
clarify this point: in the last 50 years, in US the geometric averages of the real returns from the stock 
market and from the Treasury Bills were 5.3% and 0.08%, respectively (see Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System US, 2016 and Crawford et al., 2016). If we use these data to compute r 
and s over a horizon of 30 years we obtain that r is 3.7 and s is 0.27: these values satisfy the inequality 
of Proposition 4. Given that Treasury Bills returns should be considered the lower bound for safe asset 
returns, the inequality of Proposition 4 appears to be satisfied for historical US data of the last 50 
years. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to such an empirical check. 
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also a key determinant. This is in line with the observed facts (see subsection 2.1) whereby, 
on the one hand, schooling exerts a positive effect on financial knowledge (although with a 
wide variability which depends, among other things, on the field of study) and, on the other 
hand, literacy has an effect that goes beyond mere education level. Our model also indicates 
that education systems that are more effective in providing human capital (i.e. higher x) not 
only improve human capital accumulation, but also capital market participation and financial 
literacy acquirement. As an empirically testable result, we predict that for a given level of 
schooling, financial literacy should vary across individuals depending on the field of study 
and on the efficiency of education system (at cohort, regional or country level) in producing 
human capital. 
Moreover, individuals that have developed good abilities in math and numeracy can 
be thought as having, according to our model, a higher level of z and thus, should be more 
likely to acquire financial literacy and invest in stock markets, which is line with the observed 
evidence (see subsection 2.1). 
 
6.2. Income 
Our results provide a complex relationship between income and literacy, which can be 
broken down into three components. First, both income and literacy are positively influenced 
by education: this component implies a positive correlation but not a causal relationship 
between income and literacy. Second, higher income implies higher amount of lifetime 
resources to be invested and also lower risk aversion. This in turn implies that individuals 
with higher income are keen to buy a higher amount of stocks and, consequently, of financial 
literacy in order to enter the stock market: therefore, this component entails a causal positive 
relationship between income and literacy. Finally, higher income also implies higher 
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opportunity costs and this produces a negative effect of income on the incentives to acquire 
financial literacy. Our model allows us to determine the overall effect of the latter two 
components and in particular we have that for 𝛼 ≥ 1 (that is, when relative risk aversion is 
non-increasing in income) the overall effect is non-negative whereas it is negative otherwise. 
As a consequence, if we consider all the three components we can be certain that for 𝛼 ≥ 1 
income and literacy (and stock market participation) are positively correlated whereas for 
𝛼 < 1 the sign of the relationship is undetermined. The assumption that relative risk aversion 
is non-increasing in income is usually the most realistic one (see, for example, MasColell et 
al., 1995, chapter 6) and thus, our model fully explains the observed positive correlation 
between income and financial literacy (discussed in subsection in 2.1) and between income 
and stock market participation (discussed in subsection in 2.3). Further empirical analysis 
aimed at disentangling the role of income from that of education would however be helpful to 
shed further light on the ultimate nature of the relationship between these two factors. 
 
6.3. Employment condition 
Individuals employed in sectors close to business are likely to have acquired a type of 
human capital which displays higher complementarities with financial knowledge. In 
analytical terms of our model, this implies higher z and thus, these individuals should be 
more likely to acquire financial literacy and join the stock market. A similar reasoning can be 
used for self-employed workers: in fact, it is likely that, on the one hand, the education that 
self-employed acquired to perform their work and, on the other hand, the experience they 
have gained on the job entails a certain degree of complementarity with financial education. 
In terms of our model, this translates into higher z. Moreover, given the entrepreneurial 
nature of self-employment, they should probably have lower risk aversion (higher 𝛼 in our 
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model). According to these lines of reasoning our model predicts that self-employed have 
higher probability of acquiring literacy and investing in risky assets. These theoretical 
predictions are in line with the observed evidence described in subsection 2.1 and 2.3. 
6.4. Gender 
Our model does not include any gender differences and as such, cannot account for 
gender gaps. However, we find that higher risk aversion reduces the incentive to acquire 
financial literacy and invest in stocks. Given that there exists some evidence that females 
have higher risk aversion (see Borghans et al., 2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009), this could 
explain, at least to some extent, the observed gender differences in financial literacy and 
stock market participation that we discussed in subsections 2.1 and 2.3. However, Barber et 
al. (2001) show that risk aversion alone is not always enough to explain gender differences in 
investment behavior: therefore, further empirical analyses are in any case needed to discern 
whether risk aversion, ceteris paribus, fully explains the gender gap in financial literacy or 
not. 
6.5. Wealth 
Our analysis shows that, for realistic values of the parameters, individuals who have 
acquired financial literacy and have invested in stocks tend to accumulate larger amounts of 
wealth. This result, which is in line with the empirical evidence discussed in subsection 2.2, 
is due to the fact that these individuals save larger amounts and is even truer if the stock 
market grants returns that are, on average, higher. A testable implication of our model is that 
individuals with larger financial literacy have, ceteris paribus, larger propensity to save. 
6.6. Stock market participation 
Our model strongly relates the participation in stock markets to the acquisition of 
financial literacy. As such, education and income, influencing literacy, also increase the 
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likelihood to acquire stocks, something that has been observed in reality. Moreover, we 
highlight how schooling attainment alone is not enough to explain participation, given that 
the field of study plays a relevant role too. Finally, and somehow obviously, higher risk 
aversion reduces the likelihood to acquire stocks. All these theoretical results are in line with 
the empirical evidence on the relationship between financial literacy and stock market 
participation (see subsection 2.1) and on the other determinants of participation (see 
subsection 2.3). 
6.7. The attractiveness of risky assets 
We find that the more attractive (in terms of Sharpe-ratios) the risky assets, the larger 
the incentives to acquire financial literacy and to invest in stocks. The latter result is in line 
with evidence described in subsection 2.3. The similar prediction on financial literacy 
acquisition has not been tested so far and it would be interesting to test it in terms of 
differences at cohort and/or cross-country level. 
7. Conclusions 
In the present work we have built a model that encompasses in a unified framework 
human capital investment, financial literacy acquirement, saving behavior and participation in 
the stock market. Our model provides a clear account of the effects that education, field of 
study, income and employment conditions have on financial literacy and stock market 
participation. In addition, even if we do not address it directly, the observed effect of gender 
on financial decisions can find a partial rationale within our framework in terms of 
differences in risk aversion. Some of our theoretical results stimulate further empirical 
analysis: a first empirical implication is that individuals or countries with education systems 
that perform better in producing human capital should also have higher levels of financial 
literacy and higher participation in stock markets. A second implication is that individuals 
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living in countries with education systems that provide basic financial education should 
display higher participation rates in the stock market, higher financial literacy and higher 
propensity to save. Finally, our findings put an emphasis on the role of other institutional 
factors, such as gender wage-gap or more attractive capital markets, as possible determinants 
of differences in financial literacy attainment or stock market participation, both at cohort and 
country level. All these empirical implications are left for future empirical research. Another 
interesting avenue for future research is the possible extension of the present analysis to a 
multi-period framework, in such a way that the role of age and family composition, both 
documented by the empirical literature and disregarded here, could be assessed. 
Finally, the results of our model offer some relevant policy implications. Given the 
increasing importance of private savings in determining individuals’ economic well-being in 
current and future societies, the adequacy of households’ saving is an issue of major concern. 
Our model predicts that saving behavior (and the propensity to save) depends on financial 
literacy, which in turn depends, among other things, on education. Therefore, our findings 
suggest that policies aimed at fostering general education and economics-related knowledge 
are highly beneficial both for increasing financial literacy and for promoting economic well-
being of individuals through higher saving and portfolio diversification. 
Indeed, the interaction between education and financial literacy is at the center of the 
current political debate of many countries: the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA), for example, has recently added specific modules to measure and 
evaluate the financial literacy skills of young students (see OECD, 2014) and several OECD 
countries are discussing how to promote financial education (see OECD, 2016). However, 
only few of them (UK is one of the rare examples, see OECD, 2016) actually implemented 
compulsory financial education curricula within their general education systems. Our analysis 
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provides solid arguments in support of these policies and calls for an enhancement at the 
international level. 
APPENDIX A – Micro-foundation of asset management costs and direct 
acquisition of financial literacy 
We provide here the micro-foundation of asset management costs (eq. (8) in the text). 
The basic idea we develop here is that investing in risky assets is a complex activity and 
requires time to evaluate, choose and keep track of assets performance. Given this 
complexity, it is sensible to expect that the time spent in this process depends inversely on the 
level of financial literacy of individuals. Therefore, individuals choosing to invest in risky 
assets may find it convenient to invest also part of their time not only in general education but 
also in financial education: in fact, this investment will allow them to acquire financial 
literacy and, thus, to abate the time spent in participating in financial markets. 
Hence, we assume that the time-cost entailed in financial management is made of two 
components: q and f (see eq. 7). The former is associated with time spent to evaluate, choose 
and track the risky assets performance, which is assumed to depend inversely on the level of 
financial literacy L, that is: 
𝑞 = 1 − 2𝐿          (A1) 
The latter component f is related to the time spent acquiring financial education L according 
to the following production function: 
L= (𝑓ℎ1−𝑧)1/2.          (A2) 
The output L is increasing in f and its marginal productivity depends positively on the level of 
general education of individuals (h) and on how useful the specific education is in the 
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acquisition of literacy (e.g. the field of study, measured by z). Finally, we assume that the 
marginal productivity of f is decreasing. By exploiting eqs (7), (A1) and (A2), we get: 
c(𝐿, ℎ) = 𝑑(𝑞 + 𝑓) = 𝑑(1 − 2𝐿 + 𝐿2ℎ𝑧−1).     (A3) 
By plugging eq. (A3) and the equations for the budget constraint (17) and (17b) into (1), the 
maximization problem reads as: 
max
ℎ,𝐿,𝑆,𝑅
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥−𝑑+2𝑑𝐿−𝑑𝐿2ℎ𝑧−1)−𝑆−𝑅]   − 𝛽𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2
]
.  (A4) 
The solution of (A4) with respect to L yields 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑅
𝜕𝐿
= 0 ⇒ −𝑎𝑘ℎ𝑑(2 − 2𝐿ℎ𝑧−1)𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥−𝑑+2𝑑𝐿−𝑑𝐿2ℎ𝑧−1)−𝑆−𝑅] = 0.  (A5) 
So that: 
𝐿∗ = ℎ1−𝑧          (A6) 
which, together with eq. (A3), implies: 
c(𝐿∗, ℎ) = 𝑑(1 − ℎ1−𝑧)        (A7) 
which is eq. (8) in the text. Moreover, eqs. (A6) and (19) determine the optimal level of 
financial literacy acquired by individuals: 
𝐿∗ = (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1−𝑧
𝑥−1+𝑧
.         (25) 
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APPENDIX B – Optimal levels of human capital and investment in safe 
and risky assets 
We derive here the optimal levels ℎ∗ and 𝑆∗ as given, respectively, by eqs. (12) and (13) and 
the optimal levels ℎ𝐹
∗  , 𝑅𝐹
∗  and 𝑆𝐹
∗ as given, respectively, by eqs. (19), (20) and (21). 
B.1. Derivation of 𝒉∗ and 𝑺∗ 
Consider the optimization problem max
ℎ,𝑆
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥)−𝑆]   − 𝛽𝑒−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)]. The first order 
conditions imply 
 
𝜕{−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥)−𝑆]  −𝛽𝑒−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)]}
𝜕ℎ
= 0 ⇒ 𝑎𝑘ℎ[1 − (1 + 𝑥)ℎ𝑥]𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥)−𝑆] = 0 (B1) 
 
𝜕{−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥)−𝑆]  −𝛽𝑒−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)]}
𝜕𝑆
= 0 ⇒ 𝑎𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(1−ℎ
𝑥)−𝑆]  − 𝑎𝛽(1 + 𝑠)𝑒−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)] = 0. (B2) 
From (B1) we directly obtain the optimal level of human capital ℎ∗: 
 ℎ∗ = (
1
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥
 ∎          (B3) 
and from (B2), inserting ℎ∗, we obtain the optimal level of saving 𝑆∗: 
 𝑆∗ = [𝑘ℎ∗(1 − ℎ∗𝑥) +
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
]
1
2+𝑠
. ∎       (B4) 
B.2 Derivation of 𝒉𝑭
∗  , 𝑹𝑭
∗  and 𝑺𝑭
∗  
Consider the optimization problem 
 max
ℎ,𝑆,𝑅
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(−ℎ
𝑥+ℎ1−𝑧)−𝑆−𝑅]   − 𝛽𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2
]
.  
The first order conditions imply 
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𝜕
{
 
 
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(ℎ
1−𝑧−ℎ𝑥)−𝑆−𝑅]  −𝛽𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2
]
 
}
 
 
𝜕ℎ
= 0 ⇒    (B5) 
𝑎𝑘[(2 − 𝑧)ℎ1−𝑧 − (1 + 𝑥)ℎ𝑥]𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(ℎ
1−𝑧−ℎ𝑥)−𝑆−𝑅] = 0; 
𝜕
{
 
 
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(−ℎ
𝑥+ℎ1−𝑧)−𝑆−𝑅]  −𝛽𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2
]
 
}
 
 
𝜕𝑆
= 0 ⇒    (B6) 
𝑎𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(−ℎ
𝑥+ℎ1−𝑧)−𝑆−𝑅] = 𝑎𝛽(1 + 𝑠)𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2 ]; 
 
𝜕
{
 
 
−𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(−ℎ
𝑥+ℎ1−𝑧)−𝑆−𝑅]  −𝛽𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2
]
 
}
 
 
𝜕𝑅
= 0 ⇒    (B7) 
𝑎𝑒−𝑎[𝑘ℎ(−ℎ
𝑥+ℎ1−𝑧)−𝑆−𝑅] = 𝑎𝛽[(1 + 𝑟) − 𝑎𝜎2𝑅]𝑒
−𝑎[𝑆(1+𝑠)+𝑅(1+𝑟)−
𝑎𝜎2𝑅2
2 ]. 
From eq. (B5) we directly obtain the optimal level of human capital ℎ𝐹
∗ : 
 ℎ𝐹
∗ = (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥−1+𝑧
. ∎         (B8) 
Moreover, combining eqs. (B6)-(B8) we obtain the optimal level of investment in risky 
assets 𝑅𝐹
∗  and the optimal level of investment in safe assets 𝑆𝐹
∗: 
𝑅𝐹
∗ =
𝑟−𝑠
𝑎𝜎2
. ∎          (B9) 
𝑆𝐹
∗ = [𝑊𝐹
∗ +
log𝛽(1+𝑠)
𝑎
− (2 +
𝑟+𝑠
2
)
𝑟−𝑠
𝑎𝜎2
] (
1
2+𝑠
) .∎               (B10) 
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APPENDIX C – Proof of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 
C.1. Proof of Proposition 2 
We prove here Proposition 2. From inequality (24a) we know that individuals acquire 
financial literacy and enter the stock market if 𝑊∗ −𝑊𝐹
∗ is lower than 
1
1+𝑠
(𝑟−𝑠)2
2𝑎𝜎2
. Here we 
prove that 𝑊∗ −𝑊𝐹
∗ is a decreasing function of x and z and, therefore, individuals with 
higher x or z are more likely to acquire financial literacy and enter the stock market. 
Formally, we need to prove that  
 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑥
< 0          (C1) 
 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑧
< 0.          (C2) 
Preliminarily, we define the following variables and functions: 
𝑔 ≡ 1
1+𝑥
           (C3) 
𝑝 ≡  2−𝑧
1+𝑥
          (C4) 
𝑏(𝑦) = ln 𝑦 + 1 − 𝑦         (C5) 
𝑓(𝑦) = 𝑦
𝑦
1−𝑦           (C6) 
ℎ(𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑦)𝑓(𝑦).          (C7) 
Note that by definition, we have that 0 < 𝑔 < 𝑝 < 1 and that, for 𝑦 > 0, 𝑓(𝑦) > 0 
and ℎ(𝑦) > 0. 
Starting from eq. (14) and given definition (C3) we have 
33 
 
𝑊∗ = 𝑘 (1 −
1
1+𝑥
) (
1
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥
=  𝑘(1 − 𝑔)(𝑔)
𝑔
1−𝑔.      (C8) 
Similarly, starting from eq. (20) and given definition (C3) and (C4) we have 
𝑊𝐹
∗ = 𝑘 (1 −
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
) (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
2−𝑧
𝑥−1+𝑧
=  𝑘(1 − 𝑝)(𝑝)
𝑝
1−𝑝     (C9) 
We now present four lemmas and we use them to prove eqs. (C1) and (C2). 
Lemma 1 The following properties hold true: 𝑦 > 0 ⇒ 𝑏(𝑦) ≤ 0 and 𝑦 > 0 ∩ 𝑦 ≠ 1 ⇒
𝑏(𝑦) < 0 . 
Proof. Starting from definition (C5), we have that 
𝜕𝑏(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
=
𝜕(ln𝑦+1−𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
=
1
𝑦
− 1. Therefore 
𝜕[𝑏(𝑦)]
𝜕𝑦
 is positive for y<1, zero for y=1 and negative for y>1. It follows that 𝑏(𝑦) has a global 
maximum for y=1. We have then that max
𝑦
𝑏(𝑦) = 𝑏(1) = 0 which implies that 𝑏(𝑦) ≤ 0. 
Moreover, given that 𝑏(𝑦) is zero only for y=1, we also have that 𝑏(𝑦) < 0 ∀ 𝑦 > 0 ∩ 𝑦 ≠
1. ∎ 
Lemma 2. The following property holds true: 𝑦 > 0 ∩ 𝑦 ≠ 1 ⇒
𝜕𝑓(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
< 0 . 
Proof. From definitions (C5) and (C6) we compute 
𝜕𝑓(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
=
𝑦
𝑦
1−𝑦(ln𝑦+1−𝑦)
(𝑦−1)2
=
𝑦
𝑦
1−𝑦𝑏(𝑦)
(𝑦−1)2
. From 
Lemma 1 we know that 𝑏(𝑦) > 0 ∀ 𝑦 > 0 ∩ 𝑦 ≠ 1, thus: 
𝜕𝑓(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
< 0 ∀ 𝑦 > 0 ∩ 𝑦 ≠ 1. ∎ 
Lemma 3. The following property holds true: 1/𝑒 < 𝑓(𝑝) < 𝑓(𝑔) . 
Proof. Given that 0 < 𝑔 < 𝑝 < 1, from Lemma 2 we necessarily have 𝑓(𝑝) < 𝑓(𝑔). 
Moreover, given Lemma 2, the infimum of 𝑓(𝑝) is obtained for the supremum of p, which, 
given the definition of p, is obtained for z=0 and 𝑥 → 1. Therefore, inf 𝑓(𝑝) = lim
𝑥⟶1
(
2
1+𝑥
)
1+𝑥
𝑥−1
 . 
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We prove now that  lim
𝑥⟶1
(
2
1+𝑥
)
1+𝑥
𝑥−1
= 1/𝑒. We define 𝑣 ≡
1−𝑥
1+𝑥
 and rearranging lim
𝑥⟶1
(
2
1+𝑥
)
1+𝑥
𝑥−1
 
we obtain lim
𝑣⟶0
[(1 +
1
𝑣
)
1
𝑣
]
−1
 that, by definition, is equal to 1/𝑒. We then have 1/𝑒 < 𝑓(𝑝) <
𝑓(𝑔).∎ 
Lemma 4. The following property holds true: 0 < 𝑦 ≤ 𝑝 ⇒
𝜕ℎ(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
< 0. 
Proof. From definitions (C5), (C6) and (C7) we compute 
𝜕ℎ(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
=
ℎ(𝑦)
𝜕𝑓(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
[1+ ln𝑓(𝑦)]
𝑦
. For 0 <
𝑦 ≤ 𝑝 we know: i) by definition, that y>0 and h(y)>0 are positive; ii) from Lemma 2, that 
𝜕𝑓(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
< 0; and iii) from Lemma 3, that [1 +  ln 𝑓(𝑦)] > 0. Therefore we necessarily have 
that, for 0 < 𝑦 ≤ 𝑝, 
𝜕ℎ(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
< 0. ∎ 
We use now the four lemmas to prove (C1) and (C2). 
Proof of C1. We can rearrange 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑥
 as  
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑥
= (
𝜕𝑊∗
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥
−
𝜕𝑊𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
). From the latter, 
using definition (C3) and (C4) and eqs. (C8) and (C9), we obtain 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑥
=
−𝑘𝑔 (𝑔
𝑔
1−𝑔 ln 𝑔
𝑔
1−𝑔 − 𝑝
𝑝
1−𝑝 ln 𝑝
𝑝
1−𝑝) and, from definitions (C6) and (C7), we obtain 
 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑥
= −𝑘𝑔[ln 𝑓(𝑔)𝑓(𝑔) − ln 𝑓(𝑝)𝑓(𝑝)] = −𝑘𝑔[ln ℎ(𝑔) − ln ℎ(𝑝)] . Consider now 
[ln ℎ(𝑔) − ln ℎ(𝑝)]: we know from Lemma 4 that 0 < 𝑦 ≤ 𝑝 ⇒
𝜕ℎ(𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
< 0 and, given that 
𝑔 < 𝑝, it follows that ℎ(𝑔) > ℎ(𝑝) and [ln ℎ(𝑔) − ln ℎ(𝑝)] > 0. Then 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑥
=
−𝑘𝑔[ln ℎ(𝑔) − ln ℎ(𝑝)] < 0. ∎ 
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Proof of C2. We can rearrange 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑧
 as 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑧
= (
𝜕𝑊∗
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑧
−
𝜕𝑊𝐹
∗
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
). From the latter, 
given that 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑧
= 0 and given eq. (C9), we obtain 
𝜕(𝑊∗−𝑊𝐹
∗)
𝜕𝑧
= −𝑘
𝑝
𝑝
1−𝑝
1−𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
ln 𝑝. From definition 
(C4) we have that 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
= −𝑔 < 0 and, since 0<p<1, we have that −𝑘
𝑝
𝑝
1−𝑝
1−𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
ln 𝑝 < 0. ∎ 
C.2. Proof of Proposition 3 
We prove here Proposition 3. Formally, we need to prove that  
 
𝜕𝐿∗
𝜕𝑥
> 0                    (C10) 
 
𝜕𝐿∗
𝜕𝑧
> 0                    (C11) 
where 𝐿∗ = (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1−𝑧
𝑥−1+𝑧
 . In what follows we define 𝑞 ≡ (
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
)
1
𝑥−1+𝑧
 and we use the previous 
definitions 𝑝 ≡  2−𝑧
1+𝑥
 and 𝑏(𝑦) = ln 𝑦 + 1 − 𝑦. Note that, by definition, 0 < 𝑞 < 1 and 
moreover:  𝑞 = 𝑝
1
(𝑥+1)(1−𝑝) , 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
= − 2−𝑧
(1+𝑥)2
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
= − 1
1+𝑥
< 0. 
Proof of C10. Given the equation for 𝐿∗, we simply have to prove that 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑥
> 0. Consider now 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑥
: its sign is equivalent to that of 
𝜕 log𝑞
𝜕𝑥
, with log 𝑞 =
1
1+𝑥
1
1−𝑝
log 𝑝. It follows that: 
𝜕 log 𝑞
𝜕𝑥
=
𝜕 log 𝑞
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑥
=
1
𝑞
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑥
= −
1
(1 + 𝑥)2
1
1 − 𝑝
log 𝑝 +
1
1 + 𝑥
1
(1 − 𝑝)2
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
log 𝑝 +
1
1 + 𝑥
1
1 − 𝑝
1
𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
 
and going through computation we obtain: 
 
𝜕 log𝑞
𝜕𝑥
= −
1
(1+𝑥)2
1
1−𝑝
log 𝑝 +
1
1+𝑥
1
(1−𝑝)2
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
log 𝑝 +
1
1+𝑥
1
1−𝑝
1
𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
= −
𝑞𝑏(𝑝)
(1+𝑥)2(1−𝑝)2
,  
which, given the definition for q, p and 𝑏(𝑝) is strictly positive, so that 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑥
> 0 and 
𝜕𝐿∗
𝜕𝑥
> 0. ∎ 
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Proof of C11. Given the equation for 𝐿∗ and given that 
2−𝑧
1+𝑥
< 1, we simply have to prove that 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑧
> 0. Consider now 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑧
: its sign is equivalent to that of 
𝜕 log𝑞
𝜕𝑧
, with log 𝑞 =
1
1+𝑥
1
1−𝑝
log 𝑝. 
We then have: 
𝜕 log 𝑞
𝜕𝑧
=
𝜕 log 𝑞
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑧
=
1
𝑞
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑧
= −
1
1 + 𝑥
log 𝑝
(1 − 𝑝)2
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
+
1
1 + 𝑥
1
1 − 𝑝
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
=
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
1
1 + 𝑥
1
(1 − 𝑝)2
(log 𝑝 +
1 − 𝑝
𝑝
). 
Given that p<1 strictly implies (log 𝑝 +
1−𝑝
𝑝
) < 0 and that 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑧
< 0, it follows that 
𝜕 log𝑞
𝜕𝑧
> 0 
and thus 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑧
> 0. ∎ 
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